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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the court of appeals correct in concluding that

roadblock stops violate Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in that
there is no legislative authorization for such stops?
2.

Does Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution permit

law enforcement officers to make any seizure without an individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing?
3.

Did

the

court

of

appeals

correctly

determine

that

respondent's consent to the search of his vehicle was the fruit of the illegal
roadblock stop?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals issued its opinion in State v. Sims. 808 P.2d
141 (Ut. App. 1991).
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1990 Supp.) provides this
court with jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of certiorari.
Judgment was entered by the court of appeals on March 15, 1991.

On

April 14, 1991, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file its
petition for writ of certiorari.
-1-

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUES
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §41-M7(b) through (d) (1953 as amended):
The commission, and such officers and
inspectors of the department as it shall designate,
peace officers, state patrolmen, and others duly
authorized by the department or by law shall have
power and it shall be their duty: . . .
(b) To make arrests upon view and without
warrant for any violation committed in their
presence of any of the provisions of this act or
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or the
use of the highways.
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief
that any vehicle is being operated in violation of
any provision of this act or of any other law
regulating the operation of vehicles to require the
driver thereof to stop, exhibit his drivers license
and the registration card issued for the vehicles and
submit to an inspection of such vehicle, the
registration plates and registration card thereon.
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(d) To inspect any vehicle of a type
required to be registered hereunder in any public
garage or repair shop or in any place where such
vehicles are held for sale or wrecking, for the
purpose of locating stolen vehicles and investigating
the title and registration thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-914 (1953 as amended):
(1) Within
the
boundaries
of
the
municipality, police officers have the same
authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times
the authority to preserve the public peace, prevent
crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots,
protect persons and property, remove nuisances
existing in the public streets, roads, and highways,
enforce every law relating to the suppression of
offenses, and perform all duties required of them
by ordinance or resolution.
(2) This section is not a limitation of a
police officer's statewide authority as otherwise
provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2(l)(a) and (b) (1953 as amended):
(1)

The sheriff shall:
(a)

preserve the peace;

(b)

make all lawful arrests.

Utah Code Ann. §27-10-4(i)(a) and (b) (1953 as amended):
(1)

The Utah Highway Patrol shall:

(a) enforce the state laws and rules
governing use of the state highways;
-3-

(b) regulate traffic
and roads of the state;

on all highways

Utah Code Ann. §41-1-20.5(1) (1953 as amended):
(1) The department shall require that
a certificate of inspection, as required by Section
41-6-158, or proof of exemption from inspection,
be presented at the time of, and as a condition of,
registration or renewal of registration of a motor
vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-158(1) and (2) (1953 as amended):
(1) At least once each year the department
shall require that every motor vehicle registered in
this state or bearing temporary permits or Utah
plates, except off-highway vehicles, be inspected
and that an official certificate of inspection and
approval be obtained for each vehicle.
(2) The inspection shall be made and
certificate obtained with respect to the mechanism,
brakes, and equipment of every vehicle designated
by the department under this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent was charged with possession of a controlled
substance

with intent to distribute a violation

§58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). (R.7)

of Utah

Code

Ann.

The charge was based on the

discovery of approximately one kilogram of cocaine in his vehicle. (T.52)
That discovery was made at a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Juab County.
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The roadblock was conducted by the Utah Highway Patrol under the
direction of Sargent Paul Mangleson.

(T.46-48)

At the time that

respondent was stopped at the roadblock the troopers had no reason to
believe that he was violating the law. (T.31-32)

Respondent's motion to

suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle as a result of that stop was
denied by the district court. (R.104-113)
Respondent appealed the district court's decision to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals reversed respondent's conviction.

State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Ut. App. 1991).

That court held that the

roadblock stop failed to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The court of appeals also held that the roadblock violated Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution in that the officers lacked statutory authority
to conduct a roadblock.

The court of appeals did not address respondent's

contention that Article I, Section 14 required individualized suspicion to
conduct a stop.

Finally, the court of appeals held that the respondent's

consent to the search of his vehicle was the fruit of the initial illegal stop.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH PROHIBITS ROADBLOCKS.

The first issue that the state is requesting this court to review is
the constitutionality of roadblock stops under Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

The basis for the holding in the court of appeals was

that law enforcement officers need express statutory authority to conduct
a roadblock.

The State contends that this is a novel approach meriting

review by this court.

The State further contends that the issue was

decided erroneously by the court of appeals.

That court also failed to

address respondent's contention that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution requires individualized suspicion before a stop may be made.
If

this

court

grants

petitioner's

writ

of

certiorari

to

review

the

constitutionality of roadblocks, it should also consider whether Article I,
Section 14 requires individualized suspicion before a seizure may be made.
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A.
The Court of Appeals Correctly Determined that
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
Requires Express Legislative Authority for a
Roadblock.

Petitioner contends that the roadblock issue is an important
question that should be addressed by this court.

This is somewhat

inconsistent with the position taken by the petitioner in the court of
appeals.

There, petitioner refused to address the roadblock issue either in

its brief or oral argument.

More importantly, the issue of the necessity for

legislative authority for executive action is not a novel issue in other
courts.

Even under a less restrictive fourth amendment analysis, courts

have required that law enforcement officers have statutory authority to
conduct a search or seizure that may invade an individual's fundamental
rights. State v. Marchand. 104 Wash.2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (Wash. 1985);
Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States. 397 U. S. 72 (1970).
Recent decisions from other courts addressing their respective state
constitutional provisions have reached the conclusion that the executive
authority to conduct a roadblock cannot be implied. Nelson v. Lane County.
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304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987); State v. Henderson. 114 Ida. 293, 756
P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988); State v. Smith. 674 P.2d 562 (Ok.Crim. 1984).

This

holding is based on the fact that such a stop involves a substantial invasion
of privacy interests.
The only case cited by Respondent to stand for the proposition
that there is implied authority to conduct a roadblock is People v. Estrada.
68 111. App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128 £ert, d^n. 444 U. S. 968 (1979). That
case allowed state police to conduct spot checks of motor vehicles for the
purpose of conducting safety inspections.

The court held that the need to

inspect the safety equipment on motor vehicles justified the intrusion.

The

Utah Motor Vehicle Code makes such reasoning inapplicable to safety
inspections of vehicles in Utah.

Utah Code Ann. §41-1-20-5 (1953 as

amended), requires proof of a safety inspection upon the annual renewal
of a vehicle's registration.
are described

in

Utah

The scope and nature of the safety inspection
Code

Ann.

§41-6-158

(1953

as

amended).

Furthermore, Utah Code Ann.§41-l-17(d) (1953 as amended), limits the
authority of officers to inspect vehicle titles and registrations to those
vehicles located in a public garage, repair shop or place where the vehicle
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is held for sale.

Consequently, the Utah statutes preclude the type of

safety inspections that the Illinois court authorized in Estrada.
Petitioner also contends that the reasoning of the court of
appeals is erroneous.

Petitioner cites a single sentence from the opinion by

the court of appeals as the determinative reason for the court's holding.

In

that sentence the court indicated that the Legislative process is " . . .
analogous to that performed by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant,
[emphasis added]

State v. Sims. 156 U.A.R. 8 at 12 (Ut. App. 1991). The

criticisms of this statement made by the petitioner are premised on the
assumption that the court of appeals held that the legislative process
involves the same decision as a magistrate makes in issuing a warrant.
That clearly is not what the court of appeals held.
The basis of the court of appeals' holding on the issue of
legislative authorization was that the policy decision to allow officers of the
executive branch of the government to invade the privacy of citizens
should be made by the legislative branch.

In that way, "the collective will

of the people is expressed and, furthermore, the people have notice of duly

-9-

authorized police activity" 156 U.A.R. at 12. This is not a novel concept as
petitioner contends.

It is merely a restatement of the separation of powers

doctrine on which our form of government is premised.
In a footnote, petitioner contends that a reading of several
statutes gives peace officers implied authority to conduct a roadblock.

A

close reading of those statutes results in the conclusion that officers must
either observe a violation of the law or have a reasonable belief that a
vehicle is being operated in violation of the law before they may lawfully
make a stop.

Utah Code Ann. §41-l-17(b) and (c) (1953 as amended).

The

other statutes cited by petitioner give law enforcement officers authority
to enforce the law and make lawful arrests.

See Utah Code Ann.

§§10-3-914, 17-22-2 and 27-10-4 (1953 as amended).

None of these

statutes imply any authority to make a suspicion less stop.
The court of appeals correctly held that express

legislative

authorization is necessary to allow law enforcement officers to conduct
roadblocks.

It is not a novel concept.

It is a concept based in the

separation of powers doctrine of our form of government.
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Other statutes

in the state code do not give implied authority to conduct a roadblock.
Those statutes all require individualized suspicion.

This court should not

grant petitioner's writ of certiorari on the issue of the need for express
legislative authorization.
B.
This Court Should Address the Need for
Individualized Suspicion Before a Stop May be
Properly Made Under Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution

If this court grants certiorari to review the limited decision of
the court of appeals on roadblocks, it should also review in general the
constitutionality of roadblocks under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

That would allow this court to review an issue that the court

of appeals failed to address that was raised under Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.

That issue is whether Article I, Section 14 of the

Utah Constitution allows any seizure without a showing of individualized
suspicion.

Several

courts

have

constitutions require such a showing.

held

that

their

respective

state

Commonwealth v. Tarbert. 502 A.2d
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221 (Pa. Super. 1985); State v. Henderson, supra: State v. Boyanousky. 304
Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987); State v. Parms. 532 So.2d 1293 (La.
1988).

This position is also consistent with the holding of the plurality

opinion of this court in State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 480 (Utah 1990).
In reaching this conclusion, these courts noted that roadblock
stops have been upheld because careful controls and limits on officers1
discretion at a roadblock prevents a fourth amendment violation.
courts reason

The

for requiring individualized suspicion is that a roadblock

does invade a citizen's expectation of privacy.

Any limits on officers'

discretion cannot justify such a seizure in the absence of a showing of
individualized suspicion that a crime has been committed.
The court of appeals correctly decided the issue of the need for
legislative authority for a roadblock.
to determine that issue.

This court need not grant certiorari

However, if this court feels that it would be

appropriate to consider the roadblock issue, it should also address the
question of whether Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires
individualized suspicion to make a seizure.
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POINT n
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT
TEST TO DETERMINE IF RESPONDENTS CONSENT TO
THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE WAS THE FRUIT OF
THE UNLAWFUL STOP.

Petitioner claims that the court of appeals misapplied the test
from State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) to determine if a
voluntary consent was the fruit of an unlawful stop.

Petitioner argues that

the court of appeals failed to give proper emphasis to the effect of the
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent.

In Arrovo. this

court rejected the position that a finding of a voluntary consent overrides
any harm from a prior illegal stop.

Arroyo required a two part analysis:

first there must be a determination that there was a voluntary consent, it
may next be determined if that voluntary consent was the fruit of the
illegal stop.

In addressing the fruits issue this court noted that three

factors should be addressed.

Those factors include:

the temporal

proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of the consent, the
presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct.
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The court of appeals in this case addressed each of those issues
separately.

The court found that there was insufficient time between the

stop and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between the
two.

With respect to intervening circumstances the court also found that

"... Sims' consent, then, arose from an unbroken chain of events that began
with the illegal roadblock" 156 U.A.R. at 14.

Finally, the court of appeals

found that however noble the intentions of the law enforcement

officers

were, and even though the officers did not behave in an abusive manner,
the consent did not correct the constitutional violation.
Petitioner urges that this court adopt an analysis from Florida v.
R o v e r , 460 U. S. 491 (1983).
voluntariness of the consent.

The issue addressed in Rover was the

The Court in Rover held that the coercive

nature of the detention made any consent involuntary.

This is a different

issue as was addressed in both Arroyo and by the court of appeals in this
case. In Arroyo the initial question to be decided is whether the consent
was voluntary.

If the consent is found to be voluntary, then the three

issues previously discussed must be addressed to determine if that
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voluntary consent was the fruit of the prior illegal stop.

The R o v e r

analysis urged by petitioner would do away with any analysis of the fruits
issue.

Ultimately, a voluntary consent could ameliorate any previous

illegal stop.

This is a position that this court expressly rejected in Arroyo.

Certiorari should be denied on this issue.
CONCLUSION
This court should deny the petition for writ of certiorari in this
case.

The court of appeals correctly held that Article I, Section 14 of the

Constitution of Utah prohibits roadblocks.

However, if certiorari is granted

this court should also address the question of whether Article I, Section 14
requires individualized

suspicion.

Furthermore, the court of appeals

correctly analyzed this issue of the fruits of an unlawful stop as required
by State v. Arroyo, supra.

Certiorari should not be granted on that issue.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June, 1991.

G.FREDMETOS
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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